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Civil Society Participation in International Governance:  
The UN and the WTO Compared 
ABSTRACT 
Civil society participation has become a buzzword in the debate about the legitimacy 
and accountability of international governance. Many organizations, prominently 
among them the World Trade Organization (WTO), have come under considerable 
pressure to open up their policy-making process towards non-state actors. Although the 
WTO has become more transparent in recent years, direct stakeholder access to its pol-
icy making is still denied. This situation is often contrasted with that at the United Na-
tions (UN), where there is (allegedly) much more formally regulated and more substan-
tial participation of civil society. In this paper, we compare the patterns of participation 
in these two organizations and seek to identify some common dynamics. We present a 
general framework for analysis based on a model of the policy cycle that allows us to 
distinguish ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that determine cooperation in different phases of 
policy making.  
In our empirical study, we find that in the WTO, there are few incentives for the or-
ganization itself to pull civil society actors into its policy-making process. Agenda-
setting is the task of governments; research and analysis is delivered by the Secretariat; 
compliance control is undertaken jointly by the organization and its members. To push 
the door to trade policy making open, civil society can only rely on public shaming, that 
is, threatening to undermine the organization’s legitimacy as it violates widely accepted 
standards of good governance. In the UN system, there is in fact more cooperation, but 
it remains largely limited to the policy phases of agenda-setting, research and analysis 
and compliance control. Quite like the WTO, the UN protects an intergovernmental 
core of policy making in which cooperation with civil society remains at the discretion 
of state parties. Evidence for this are informal and ad hoc ways of collaboration and a 
lack of participatory rights for non-state actors in the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.  
We conclude that studying civil society participation in international public organiza-
tions through the lens of the policy cycle can give us a fine-grained picture of coopera-
tive arrangements and enables us to identify potentials for cooperation as well as exclu-
sion. Yet, we also observed two other factors at work that were not really grasped by the 
model of the policy cycle. First, the institutional culture of organizations can be more or 
less amenable to civil society. Second, organizations are susceptible to campaigns for 
‘good governance’ that invoke standards of due process and may open the door to non-
state actors. 
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Civil Society Participation in International Governance:  
The UN and the WTO Compared1 
I.  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NON-STATE ACTORS: 
EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION 
The existing literature about the interaction between international governmental organi-
zations (IGOs) and civil society2 follows two separate lines of inquiry. First, there is a 
bulk of literature from law and (broadly conceived) political theory that asks whether 
civil society should interact with IGOs. The answer here is often affirmative. Many au-
thors argue that involving non-state actors into policy making can contribute to the le-
gitimacy and accountability of international governance. This case has been made for 
the United Nations system and for global governance in general (e.g. Alger, 1999; Brühl 
and Rittberger, 2001; Scholte, 2004). It has been made likewise by authors who suggest 
enhanced participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)3 in the WTO (Bell-
mann and Gerster, 1996; Charnovitz, 1996; Shell, 1996; Esty, 2002).  
Three major arguments for the desirability of enhanced cooperation can be distin-
guished in this debate. First, NGOs may possess technical expertise that international 
organizations cannot acquire on their own. Widening their knowledge base through 
consultation with non-state actors, IGOs will take more informed and more effective 
policy decisions. NGO participation hence improves the effectiveness of global govern-
ance. Second, NGOs can channel citizens’ values, interests and concerns into interna-
tional policy making. They therefore enlarge the range of viewpoints and arguments 
present in political deliberation. At the same time, they give a voice to (minority) 
groups of stakeholders that are inadequately represented in a governance system based 
on the principle of ‘one state, one vote’. NGO participation therefore is an asset to the 
                                                 
1  Jens Steffek is assistant professor, Claudia Kissling research fellow in the Collaborative Research Centre “Trans-
formations of the State” at the University of Bremen. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). For helpful comments we wish to thank Kerstin Martens. 
2  It is a contested question, who is or should be regarded as part of civil society (Castiglione 1998). The term inter-
national (or transnational) civil society has been in use only for a decade or so and usually has been related to 
ideals of democratization or citizen emancipation (Lipschutz, 1992; Anheier et al. 2001). We propose to define 
international civil society by its activity. Members of civil society are all those non-governmental, non-profit ac-
tors that seek to influence political deliberation about public norms by means of argumentation.  
3  Recently, the reference to NGOs has been at least partly supplanted by the term of civil society, which has been 
increasingly used in academic literature on global governance and in statements of IGOs. Technically speaking, 
however, most IGOs interact only with organized civil society, and hence non-governmental organizations. 
Therefore, in our analysis we use the term NGO to describe a non-state, non-profit making organization. 
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democratic legitimacy of global governance. Third, NGOs may also contribute to the 
creation of a public sphere of global governance (Nanz and Steffek, 2004). They com-
municate developments in international politics to the local basis of their own organiza-
tions or networks and bring them to the attention of the mass media. Through these 
channels, information on international policy making feeds into national public debates 
and is in that way able to reach citizens as the ultimate addressees of global governance. 
NGOs are often regarded as weaving a ‘connecting tissue’ (Esty, 2002:17) between a 
global citizenry and the institutions of international policy making. This, in brief, is why 
so many authors believe that civil society should interact (or interact more) with interna-
tional organizations.  
As a normative rationale, this is obviously highlighting potentials rather than reflect-
ing present practice. Quite detached from the normative debate, we find a second strand 
of inquiry: an equally rich literature, mainly from political science, that asks why (and 
how) civil society actually does interact with IGOs.4 These two strands of investigation 
rarely refer to each other. However, the empirical literature is relevant for normatively 
oriented scholars as well, because it seeks to explain dynamics and motivations behind 
current practice. If we plead for more collaboration of NGOs with IGOs from a norma-
tive point of view, we should also know why and how present patterns of interaction 
came about. Most authors interested in such empirical questions have adopted the per-
spective of NGOs or political activists, investigating their strategies and tactics in deal-
ing with IGOs and state representatives, with the aim of discovering determinants of 
NGO success in influencing politics (e.g., Arts, 1998: 55-61; Keck and Sikking, 1998: 
25-29; Risse, 2002: 262-268). The title of an early work in this genre captures the ap-
proach well: ‘International Non-Governmental Organizations: their Purposes, Methods 
and Accomplishments’ (White, 1968).  
Yet, it seems equally interesting to reverse the perspective and ask why international 
organizations might wish to interact with NGOs. An appropriate analytical framework 
should take both perspectives into account. There is some literature which tackles the 
question of why IGOs – despite pressure put on them by NGOs – are reluctant to col-
laborate with civil society (Alger, 2002:esp. 98-100; UN 2003:18-19); or why certain 
IGOs are more or less susceptible to pressure by NGOs (Willets, 2000:193; Riggirozzi 
and Tussie, 2001). However, IGOs do not just fend NGOs off. IGOs in fact may have 
good reason to engage with non-state actors at their own initiative because they can ex-
pect certain advantages from collaboration. A variety of incentives for IGOs to collabo-
                                                 
4  The literature on NGOs in international affairs is extensive. For an overview of the role of non-state actors in 
international relations (both NGOs and multinational corporations), see Risse, 2002; for civil society, see Anheier 
et al. 2001. 
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rate with non-state actors has been mentioned throughout the existing literature. Yet, to 
date there is no systematic overview of the relationship between the two types of ac-
tors.5 
As a starting point of our own inquiry, we ask what motivations both types of actors 
might have for engaging in cooperation. The assumption is that collaboration between 
NGOs and IGOs can be the result of two different dynamics: NGOs might push into 
institutions of global governance; or IGOs might pull them in.6 Hence, we deem it use-
ful to distinguish between such ‘push’ factors and ‘pull’ factors that determine patterns 
of collaboration. To get a more fine-grained empirical picture, a second useful distinc-
tion can be made between different phases in the process of international policy making. 
As a heuristic framework, we adopt a model of the policy cycle with six phases to ac-
count for the fact that incentives for collaboration might change over time and on both 
sides.7 They might also depend upon the specific tasks that an IGO or an NGO are pur-
suing with regard to the phases of the policy cycle. The first phase is called agenda-
setting, since here IGOs try to define and structure their work plan and the issues to be 
discussed and decided upon during a cycle of policy making. Research and analysis 
characterizes the second phase which mainly deals with acquiring background informa-
tion on the selected policy issues and drawing first conclusions from research results. 
This task mostly is assigned to IGO secretariats. Policy formulation and policy decision, 
the third and fourth phase, are reserved to politicians who formulate and take decisions 
on the pending issues on the agenda. Fifth, policy implementation takes place after deci-
sions have been taken. The sixth and last phase relates to policy evaluation and offers an 
overall assessment of the implementation phase. It thus gives indications on success or 
failure of implementation strategies with regard to the relevant policy goals to be 
achieved, and as such spawns concerns to be fed in during the first two phases of the 
policy cycle again. 
                                                 
5  Albin (1999) comes closest to what we have in mind but she only touches upon many of these issues in her dis-
cussion of the roles that NGOs play in multilateral intergovernmental negotiations. 
6  When speaking of IGOs in this context, we refer to their governance structure controlled by governments, rather 
than to the Secretariat of the organization. During most policy phases, both actors are supposed to have more or 
less identical interests, since Secretariats have to implement governmental decisions, or their actions at least are 
expected not to run contrary to governmental intentions. However, this can be significantly different in the policy 
formulation and policy decision phases. Here, Secretariats might have an incentive to pull NGOs in order to in-
fluence the final policy decision in their own's interest. 
7  The policy cycle is a concept developed in public policy research that distinguishes certain phases in a standard 
procedure of policy making. Although the overall structure of the various ‘policy cycles’ in use is always similar, 
models vary with regard to the number and description of discrete phases. 
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Let us apply the idea of pull factors – or the interests of IGOs in collaborating with 
NGOs – to the different phases of the policy cycle. Based on the existing literature, we 
can identify four possible instances in which an IGO might be interested in collabora-
tion with non-state actors. First, IGOs might seek NGO assistance in order to pinpoint 
new or upcoming issues which should be dealt with. This is presumably the case for 
‘forum organizations’, such as the UN, whose task it is to identify and discuss rising 
problems in the international system. In this context, it has often  been suggested that 
globalization and the corresponding increase in the scope, fora, and complexity of post-
Cold War international negotiations have set conditions in which outside assistance for 
agenda-setting, and for informing the policy formulation in general, is useful (Albin, 
1999:372). At a further stage, an IGO might seek NGO collaboration to acquire addi-
tional expertise for its own policy-making process (Charnovitz, 1997; Martens, 2003). 
This seems particularly useful when there is uncertainty about the problem that interna-
tional governance is designed to resolve. This function of non-state actors has been 
highlighted, inter alia, in the literature on epistemic communities in international envi-
ronmental governance (Haas, 1992). Yet, also the IMF, for example, keeps close ties 
with non-governmental research institutions and think tanks to tap into their macroeco-
nomic expertise (Scholte, 2002:23/24).  
Third, and most importantly, an IGO might seek NGO collaboration in the imple-
mentation phase of the policy cycle. Organizations active in the field of development, 
for example, rely heavily on non-state actors in implementing their policies (Chabbott, 
1999). In the case of the World Bank, around 70% of all development projects are im-
plemented in collaboration with non-governmental organizations.8 Fourth, an IGO 
might seek NGO collaboration to monitor parties’ compliance with international norms 
(UN, 2003:6). Some IGOs do not have sufficient staff and resources to effectively 
monitor compliance with their policies. They hence make use of information provided 
by non-state actors about the situation ‘on the ground’. Human rights protection in the 
United Nations is an excellent example of such collaboration: the system of surveillance 
would simply not work without NGO input (Dupuy, 1986:259; Gaer, 1996:55). 
Investigating push factors, we change the perspective and adopt the viewpoint of a 
civil society organization. What reasons might they have to seek interaction with an 
IGO? First, they might seek to bring a new issue on the international agenda. The cam-
paign against landmines, for instance, was initiated by NGOs pushing for international 
recognition of these weapons as a problematic category in need of multilateral regula-
tion (Price, 1998:619-623). Second, they might seek to influence the research process 
                                                 
8  Source: World Bank-Civil Society Collaboration – Progress Report for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, p. 4. On file 
electronically at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/ProgRptFY0001.pdf, accessed 22 July 2004.  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 42) 
- 5 - 
that informs the definition of problems and political options. Much of NGO activity in 
the field of climate change for example falls into this category: environmental NGOs as 
well as business NGOs try to feed their assessment of the imminence and risks of man-
made climate change into the fact-finding process of the international regime (Yamin 
and Depledge, 2004: 50-53). Third, and arguably in most cases, NGOs might try to in-
fluence an IGO’s policy formulation and decision in an issue area, because the values or 
interests that the NGO pursues can only or best be realized by exerting political influ-
ence at the international level.  
However, the wish to influence the process of policy making is not necessarily the 
only motivation for NGOs seeking collaboration with an IGO. Many international 
NGOs are in fact in continual search for money, and IGOs, in particular those active in 
the field of development and humanitarian aid, can be considerable sources of financing 
(Bichsel, 1996:236-238; Cooley and Ron, 2002). Therefore, an alternative explanation 
of why NGOs push towards collaboration with IGOs is organizational self-interest: the 
non-state actor needs funding to survive. Along the phases of the policy cycle, there are 
two situations in which financial self-interest may be of major importance: when NGOs 
provide studies or data to IGOs, i.e. commissioned expertise; second, when NGOs are 
paid for implementing the projects financed by an IGO. Finally, NGOs might also seek 
to monitor parties’ compliance with rules or decisions of the IGO that they support. The 
following table now summarizes all explanatory factors examined so far. 
Table 1: Incentives for Collaboration between IGOs and NGOs 
Influencing  
factors 
 
Policy phase 
Pull factors 
(IGOs pulling NGOs in) 
Push factors 
(NGOs pushing into IGOs) 
Agenda-setting IGOs seek NGO assistance in  identifying new issues 
NGOs seek to influence the IGO’s 
agenda 
Research and analysis IGOs seek NGO collaboration to acquire additional expertise 
NGOs seek to inform the research 
process and/or seek financing for 
the provision of expertise 
Policy formulation - NGOs seek to influence the IGO’s policy formulation 
Policy decision - NGOs seek to influence the IGO’s policy choices 
Policy implementation IGOs seek NGO collaboration to implement their own projects 
NGOs seek financing for the 
implementation of projects 
Policy evaluation IGOs seek NGO data to monitor parties’ compliance 
NGOs wish to assure parties’ 
compliance 
 
This table reveals that, in general, there is potential for IGO/NGO cooperation in almost 
all phases of policy making, in particular in the agenda-setting and research phase, and 
during the implementation of projects. That there is potential does not mean that we will 
observe cooperation in all cases. Rather, the factors we identified should help us to un-
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derstand why this potential is realized in some cases and not in others. Many IGOs, for 
example, do not need any data or information from NGOs because they can rely on their 
own staff or national experts, or a combination of both. Likewise, rule-making IGOs 
quite simply do not have any projects to implement and hence no funding to give to 
non-state actors. Conversely, NGOs might not be interested in some international or-
ganizations because they do not perceive their policies to affect their values, interests or 
those of their constituencies. The amount of de facto cooperation between IGOs and 
civil society in the different phases of policy making will hence depend on the specific 
circumstances of the case. 
It is striking, however, that pull factors, according to the literature, seem to be absent 
in the central stage of the policy-making process: the formulation of decisions. Many 
NGOs, quite obviously, would like to influence these policy decisions. Yet, the IGO or 
the state representatives negotiating in it are not likely to reap any benefits from NGO 
presence at this stage.9 On the contrary, public exposure threatens to obstruct package 
deals being made among diplomats and politicians (Stavasage, 2004). Thus, we can 
assume that IGOs will be eager to protect an intergovernmental core of decision-
making against NGO influence and public scrutiny. By the metaphor intergovernmental 
core, we mean all those processes of negotiation in which a political decision is immi-
nent and state representatives (and not bureaucrats or experts) are the driving force. In 
this case, incentives for liaising with non-governmental actors are presumably low. If 
non-state actors are present in this phase of the policy cycle, this can only be due to a 
massive push on the part of civil society.  
In the following, we will use the analytical framework presented above to explain 
patterns of interaction between civil society and two IGOs: the UN and the WTO. In the 
case of the UN, a forum organization, we would expect incentives for the organization 
to consult with NGOs in four policy phases: agenda-setting, research and analysis, pol-
icy implementation, and policy evaluation. NGOs in turn presumably would try to exert 
influence at every stage of the policy cycle. With regard to the WTO, an organization 
that emerged from the ‘club-model’ of the GATT, we would expect rather little incen-
tives on the part of the IGO, while NGOs should have an interest in collaboration. Ap-
plying our theoretical model to two IGOs with completely different characteristics, we 
expect insights into the explanatory power of the factors we identified. We also hope to 
                                                 
9  Individual state representatives, delegations, or IGO staff members might still collaborate in this phase with 
NGOs if they have a common position on the issues at stake. They might, for example, pass on selected informa-
tion about the negotiation process to be made public by the NGO. However, it is unlikely that all state representa-
tives will have a discernable interest in collaboration in the phase of decision-making. 
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learn more about the usefulness of distinguishing phases of policy making along the 
policy cycle. 
II. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS AND THE UN 
The UN encompasses a variety of bodies, institutions and policy fields and as such af-
fords vast opportunities for research on IGO-NGO collaboration. In this paper, we re-
strict our analysis to the main policy-making bodies or organs of the United Nations and 
to the main institutional relationships of those organs with NGOs, namely, those of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UN Conferences, the General Assembly 
(GA), the Security Council (SC), and the Department of Public Information (DPI). We 
hence largely exclude the UN Specialized Agencies and the wider range of organiza-
tions which are part of the UN system. 
a) The ECOSOC Prototype 
ECOSOC consultative status of NGOs to this day is largely considered to be a prototype 
of NGO-IGO relations. Not only because it is one of the oldest, but also one of most 
broadly regulated and institutionalized UN-NGO relationships. However, what is less 
known is the fact that NGOs already participated widely in the initiation of their own 
status at ECOSOC. During the negotiation on a new general international organization, 
which was to become the United Nations, NGOs exerted a certain influence in this way. 
Here, the identification of a new general framework for international governance was at 
stake. Strictly speaking, this does not directly relate to our model of policy phases, but 
rather is situated at the outset of the model itself. However, it could be regarded as a 
separate policy cycle, in which, as will be seen, the phases of agenda-setting and re-
search and analysis prominently emerged with regard to governments' readiness to co-
operate with civil society. NGOs, on their part, successfully lobbied during the decision-
making phase in order to push some of the issues affecting them through. 
During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which took place from 21 August to 7 Oc-
tober 1944 und which adopted the Dumbarton Oaks ‘Proposals for the Establishment of 
a General International Organization’, the US governmental delegation closely worked 
with NGOs in so-called ‘off-the-record’ discussions (Stoecker, 2000:64-65). At that 
point, different policy options and their consequences had to be defined. Since this col-
laboration was fruitful, it prepared the ground for further NGO participation during the 
founding conference of the UN from 25 April to 26 June 1945 in San Francisco (Char-
novitz, 1997: 250). The US delegation included 42 of the most important American or-
ganizations as consultants. Many of those NGOs were concerned with social problems, 
which might to some extent explain why consultative status in the end was accorded 
exclusively with regard to ECOSOC (Archer, 1983:306). In addition, 160 other Ameri-
can NGOs, represented by ‘outstanding figures in American public life’, were invited as 
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observers. Altogether, representatives of 1,200 voluntary organizations were present on 
the spot (Alger, 2002:93). However, at that time, governments, including the American, 
seem to have had less incentives to give NGOs a voice since different policy options 
already had been expounded and what was left was the final decision of how the new 
organization was supposed to work. Nevertheless, civil society, supported by US Presi-
dent Roosevelt, managed to be heard during the decision-making process. Thanks to the 
NGO representatives represented at San Francisco, rules about participation of NGOs 
found their way into the Charter of the United Nations, alongside with the first seven 
words of the Charter: ‘We the peoples of the United Nations’ (Alger, 2002:93). Insti-
gated by a proposal of the Working Group on Agriculture, Business, Labour, and Edu-
cation, consultative status for NGOs with ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies was intro-
duced into Article 71 of the UN Charter. This Article in fact was a compromise formula 
which was meant to delimit NGO consultative collaboration from ‘participation without 
vote’ accorded to specialized agencies (Article 70) and to non-member States of 
ECOSOC (Article 69) (Stoecker, 2000: 65-67). 
The implementation of the new NGO consultative status then pointed to a prepon-
derant interest of ECOSOC members in collaborating during the first two policy phases. 
A forum organization such as the UN seems to have some incentive to rely on NGO 
input in certain policy areas, especially social and humanitarian questions, during the 
agenda-setting and research phases. NGOs, however, appear to also have major interests 
in decision-making itself. Governments seem to have anticipated that opening ways for 
collaboration with NGOs might be used as a leverage for further civil society influence 
in policy making and therefore installed a tightened accreditation procedure forestalling 
too much – and unwelcome – impact of NGOs during the main decision-making phase. 
Since ECOSOC is situated at a high decision-making level within the UN hierarchy, 
project execution is left to lower level bodies and institutions. This explains the fact 
that, in the case of ECOSOC itself, policy implementation and evaluation hardly play a 
role.  
After a first resolution adopted in 1948, ECOSOC in the course of the years agreed 
to three main resolutions, which shaped its relationship with NGOs and gave it an insti-
tutionalized structure10. The last, adopted in 1996, was meant to enhance the role of na-
tional NGOs and those from developing countries and economies in transition. As in the 
preceding resolutions, NGOs now have to pass an accreditation procedure through 
which they are classified into three categories. ‘General consultative status’ (G) is ac-
corded to large, international NGOs that work on most of the issues on ECOSOC’s 
                                                 
10  See ECOSOC resolution (288 (X)) of 27 February 1950, ECOSOC resolution 1296 (XLIV) on 23 May 1968, and 
ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996. 
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agenda; ‘Special consultative status’ (S) is granted to NGOs that have competence in a 
few of ECOSOC’s issue areas; and ‘roster consultative status’ (R) is given to NGOs 
which ECOSOC considers to make occasional useful contributions to its work. Once 
accredited within one of those categories, NGOs can participate as observers at public 
meetings of the Council, its committees and sessional bodies (G/S), or at least be pre-
sent at those meetings which are concerned with matters within their field of compe-
tence (R). They are notified of the date of the opening of each ECOSOC session, have 
large speaking and submission rights, and partly (G) can even put topics on the agenda, 
if agreed to by the NGO Committee or the relevant subsidiary organ of the Council. In 
sum, there might be some reason to argue that ECOSOC consultative status testifies to a 
certain need of the organization to acquire expert knowledge with regard to defining 
policy issues and formulating policy options (Dupuy, 1986:255). Since in the 1940s und 
1950s the most active and effective international NGOs were those concerned with so-
cial and humanitarian concerns (Archer, 1983:306), their interests beneficially corre-
lated with the issues to be dealt with by ECOSOC. 
However, governments from the beginning kept a vigilant eye on no further rights 
being granted to NGOs. Thus, the privileges accorded to NGOs are contrasted by a 
tightly regulated system of accreditation. Eleven criteria have to be fulfilled, which, in 
addition, are regularly  re-examined by mode of NGO activity reports every fourth year, 
possibly leading to suspension up to three years or withdrawal of status. In the case of 
national NGOs, the Member State concerned has to approve accreditation. Moreover, 
ECOSOC is the only UN domain where an inter-governmental committee is in charge 
of UN-NGO relations. The 19-member Committee on Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions has the final say on NGO accreditation, suspension, or withdrawal of status, even 
though NGOs dispose of some limited rights during the procedure. In 2006, it incorpo-
rated some members with a rather sceptical stand towards NGOs11. Furthermore, for 
NGOs in general consultative status, statements before the Council or its sessional 
committees are restricted to one per NGO, to be approved by the Council or its ses-
sional committee on recommendation of the NGO Committee. NGOs in special consul-
tative status are only heard by the Council in case there is no subsidiary body of the 
Council with jurisdiction in the field of their interest. At commissions or other subsidi-
ary organs, speaking rights of NGOs are somewhat larger but in the case of roster 
NGOs are only accorded on the recommendation of the Secretary-General and at the 
request of the relevant body. For written contributions, restrictions as to the length of 
the statement, submission period, and to the comments of the Secretary-General to be 
included are of an even more complex nature. These complicated procedures seem to 
                                                 
11  China, Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Turkey, USA, and Zimbabwe. 
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indicate that governments try to protect policy making against too much NGO impact 
and interference in decision-making. Moreover, the sheer number of criteria seems to be 
the reason for more and more NGOs preferring less formalized, but more flexible modes 
of participation, which at least give some leeway for partaking in the decision-making 
procedure12 (UN, 2003:7). Nevertheless, the number of NGOs in consultative status has 
grown significantly throughout the years. Whereas in 1948, there was a total of 41 ac-
credited NGOs, their number had grown to 377 in 1968, to 1,350 in 1998 (Alger, 
2002:95), and to 2,719 in 200613. 
b) Dynamic Developments Spreading in and around UN Conferences 
The institutionalized procedures for NGO participation in ECOSOC constituted the 
main basis for UN-NGO relations during the first 20 years. They were also applicable to 
UN Conferences called by ECOSOC. However, from the 1970s onwards, UN Confer-
ences were attended more and more frequently by NGOs, which leads us to the supposi-
tion that NGO interests – and hence their push factors – had changed significantly. As 
we will see, these push factors mainly related to agenda-setting and decision-making. 
Yet, governments' reluctance to open up policy formulation and decision-making only 
slightly changed, even though access for NGOs to Conferences in general and to the 
first two policy phases, agenda-setting and research in specific, improved. 
After the 1968 ECOSOC reform, which had introduced new rules on financing of 
NGOs, on suspension and on withdrawal of consultative status, ECOSOC-NGO rela-
tions began to stagnate - some called it ‘underachievement’ (Charnovitz, 1997:258-
261). At that time, development issues had come to the forefront, given the enormous 
number of developing countries having attained independence. This led to NGOs be-
coming more and more politically oriented - a role they had shunned before -, including 
also trade issues or economic and social justice on their action agenda. These new man-
dates in turn constituted a spur for NGOs to use UN Conferences, mostly focusing on 
development issues, as a catalyst for progress in civil society participation. More flexi-
ble rules of procedure, parallel conferences and NGO Fora allowed for easily obtainable 
possibilities of NGOs to shape the Conferences’ agenda, even though this never resulted 
in giving NGOs a role in decision-making itself (Archer, 1983:309-311). 
After the International Conference on Human Rights of 1968, the UN Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 was widely seen as a watershed in the 
engagement of NGOs in international conference diplomacy (Conca, 1996:105; 111). 
Supported by the Conference Secretary-General, NGOs that did not fit into the tradi-
                                                 
12  This was also attested by the NGO liaison officer of OHCHR in an interview of 2004. 
13  See http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/about.htm, and for a list, http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ 
ngo/pdf/INF_List.pdf, both accessed 10 January 2006. 
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tional ECOSOC categories were admitted to the event. Moreover, it was the first con-
ference with a major parallel NGO meeting taking place. An NGO statement was read 
in the plenary of the Conference. In addition, an NGO daily newspaper was published 
and gained credibility with delegations and the Secretariat. In the aftermath of the 
Stockholm Conference, the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974 even integrated 
NGOs in the inner workings, including committees, of a UN conference (Archer, 
1983:314-317).  
Almost twenty years later, the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), the ‘Rio Conference’ or ‘Earth Summit’ took place in 1992. It was consid-
ered to have been another turning point in NGO-UN relations (Alger, 2002:95). Mean-
while, an explosive growth in scale and scope of NGOs active in the field had taken 
place due to increasing concern with environmental matters since the 1980s. In Rio, 
NGO representatives which did not have consultative status with ECOSOC were in-
volved in the meetings of the four Preparatory Committees (PrepComs). Five NGOs 
even were allowed to sit among the working parties of the PrepCom sessions (Conca, 
1996:111). However, their input on agenda-setting at an early stage remained limited 
(Albin, 1999:374). After all, the result of the Conference, Agenda 21, devoted one chap-
ter (Chapter 27) to the strengthening of the role of NGOs - as one of nine ‘major 
groups’ - as ‘partners for sustainable development’ (Stoecker, 2000:69). After the Con-
ference, the General Assembly and ECOSOC set up a special category for participation 
of 550 NGOs, which had taken part in UNCED, in the work of the new Commission on 
Sustainable Development, a functional commission of ECOSOC (Willets, 2000:194). 
As consultative status with ECOSOC had been bypassed, the Rio Conference created 
an important precedent and trend-setter for some creative mechanisms of NGO partici-
pation in subsequent world conferences, such as the World Conference on Human 
Rights (Vienna, 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development 
(Cairo, 1994), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the 
World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), and Habitat II (Istanbul, 1996), but also 
in the follow-up to these conferences, especially the Rio Conference (Willets, 2000:194-
196; 201; Alger, 2002:95-96). NGO involvement in some of these Conferences was said 
to have contributed significantly to reaching consensus in certain difficult policy areas, 
such as reproductive health and women’s rights (UN, 2003:6). A new momentum was 
gained with the organization of part of the 2000 session of the UN General Assembly in 
form of a Millennium Summit, which was preceded by a large NGO forum, the Millen-
nium Forum. The latter was judged by some to have constituted a potential prototype 
for an ongoing UN People’s Assembly (Alger, 2002:95; 115). This was followed by 
new opening possibilities during the International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment (Monterrey, 2002), the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannes-
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burg, 2002), and the World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva, 2003) (UN, 
2003:11). 
c) The Intrusion of Civil Society into New Policy-Making Bodies 
through the Back-Door 
None of those Conferences was followed by an institutionalization14 or an outreach of 
the new procedures to other main UN bodies, especially the GA or the SC15. At every 
event, NGOs had to start from zero to struggle for more participatory rights - or to ac-
cept, as one commentator put it: “two steps forward and one backwards”16. This seems 
to evidence the presumption that the higher the level of policy making, the more gov-
ernments want to keep a final say on the policy decision and thus do not have any incen-
tive to collaborate with NGOs, but rather vigorously struggle to keep them from further 
penetrating the policy cycle. 
After the Earth Summit in 1992, UN reform proposals, worked out in response to the 
enthusiasm generated by NGO participation, mushroomed, but ultimately all failed. For 
example, ECOSOC decision 1996/297 of 25 July 1996 had recommended that the Gen-
eral Assembly examine the question of participation of NGOs in all areas of work of the 
UN. Its adoption was only made possible by adding an interpretative statement which 
restricted the scope of this paragraph to the competence of the General Assembly as set 
forth in Article 10 of the UN Charter, thus excluding peace and security matters dealt 
with by the Security Council. Subsequently, in the General Assembly Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Strengthening of the UN System, a sub-group on NGOs was 
formed in late 1996. However, it reached a deadlock following disagreement over the 
scope of work and was disbanded when the parent working group was wound up in July 
1997 (Willets, 2000:198-200). The General Assembly instead requested the Secretary 
General, and later NGOs and others, to simply report on current arrangements for 
NGOs17.  
                                                 
14  Apart from the changes adopted in ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, which provided for a standard 
procedure for accreditation by conference preparatory committees encompassing all conferences convened by any 
organ of the UN. 
15  With the exception of the formal inclusion of some NGOs, together with voting rights, in the governance struc-
tures of a few UN-related bodies which focus on specific issues (UNAIDS; Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization; The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria). However, these new coalitions are or-
ganized on a UN inter-agency basis or outside the UN. 
16  NGO liaison officer of OHCHR in an interview of 2004. 
17  See UN GA decision 52/453 of 19 December 1997, UN Doc. A/53/170 of 10 July 1998, UN GA decision 53/452 
of 17 December 1998, and UN Doc. A/54/329 of 8 September 1999. Even though the Secretary-General's report 
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c.1) The General Assembly’s Politicized Decision-Making Power 
With regard to the UN General Assembly, the picture has to be refined through looking 
at non-institutionalized working relations of NGOs with the GA. In fact, NGOs have 
worked with the GA since the earliest days of the United Nations, although in a purely 
informal way. In the beginning, this was rare but in recent years, ‘off-the-record’ par-
ticipation indeed has been growing. On the one hand, this points to an increasing inter-
est of NGOs in policy making of the GA. On the other hand, it indicates that reluctance 
of governments to pull civil society in continues, which in consequence forestalls any 
institutionalization of NGO-GA relations. Some governmental resistance seems to have 
been broken, however, since non-formal collaboration with NGOs is sought neverthe-
less. This lets us assume that our model of the policy cycle might have to be supple-
mented by some additional overarching indicators. One of those could be the fact that 
networking among different actors from civil society and governments might weaken 
resistance and create new pull or push incentives on one or the other part. 
In fact, from the earliest days of the United Nations, some selected, mostly humani-
tarian NGOs attended meetings of GA Committees, usually the First or the Fourth 
Committee. Yet, their interest was low-key and directed towards ECOSOC rather than 
the GA. In the early 1960s, the Special Committee on Decolonization, the Special 
Committee Against Apartheid and the Committee on Palestinian Rights18 developed 
special relations with NGOs. From the 1970s on, NGOs have taken part in the commit-
tee work of Special Sessions of the GA (development, disarmament, drugs, and apart-
heid). In 1971, the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space even formally granted observer status at its meetings to a Category II NGO, the 
International Astronautical Federation (Willets, 2000:196-197). NGOs addressed a 
regular GA Committee (its 2nd) in November 1993 during its preparatory work for the 
International Conference on Population and Development. For this purpose, the official 
debate was adjourned (UN, 2003:11). 
This collaboration later also involved the General Assembly itself. The first GA Spe-
cial Session addressed by NGOs was the tenth on disarmament in 1978, and then the 
19th on the five-year review of the Rio Conference in 199719. At that time, the NGO 
community had expanded, included more national and southern NGOs, and was increas-
ingly activist and issue based. The shift towards a de-compartmentalization and an inte-
gration of issues, such as the concept of sustainable development, resulted in a higher 
                                                                                                                                               
mainly focused on improvements of UN-NGO relations at the level of the UN Secretariat and to speed up NGO 
access to information and documents, this did not find the approval of governments in the end. 
18  No longer in existence. 
19  See UN GA decision 51/467 of 18 April 1997. 
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interest of NGOs in the overarching political affairs of the General Assembly and in 
major global negotiations20. After much discussion, NGOs also addressed most of the 
following GA Special Sessions (UN, 2003:11). Some NGO leaders even took the floor 
at the GA, which was then meeting as a committee of the whole, or during a formal sus-
pension of the meeting to hear NGO representatives. In this context, NGO protests dur-
ing the human rights five-year review in the regular GA session in 1998 led to an unof-
ficial NGO meeting being convened (Willets, 2000:202). Apart from this, some selected 
NGOs have been given observer status in the General Assembly. However, this remains 
limited to NGOs with an exceptional status21 and was at times highly controversial22. 
Progress towards NGO inclusion since has been very slow. The report of the Secre-
tary-General of 1998, delivered in the context of the reform process, but not adopted in 
the end, had suggested that ECOSOC-accredited NGOs be allowed to occupy a number 
of seats in the General Assembly “as available”23. To this day, there is no official ac-
creditation procedure, neither in the General Assembly itself nor in its sub-organs. 
However, there seem to be more and more avenues for informal contacts of civil society 
and GA members24. Indeed, the growing day-to-day encounters of governmental and 
civil society representatives might operate as a gateway for civil society participation, 
even by and by in a more formal way. In this line, a recent report of a Panel of Eminent 
Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations has even suggested joining all exist-
ing UN accreditation processes into a single mechanism under the authority of the Gen-
eral Assembly, which would mean to extend civil society engagement to this forum as 
well (UN, 2004:11; 53-54). 
c.2) The Security Council and its Secretive Policy Matters 
Similarly, the Security Council, through the action of individual members, opened itself 
towards more transparency during the last decade. There were neither formal nor any 
informal ways of NGO collaboration with Security Council members. The Council was 
a pretty closed policy circle, given the secretive nature of the security issues it dealt 
with. With the emergence of the notion of ‘human security’, which also embraces hu-
                                                 
20  Archer showed this already for the 1980s; Archer, 1983:321. 
21  Such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which enjoys international legal personality given its 
specific tasks with regard to humanitarian law, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Socie-
ties, its international federation, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources, a hybrid organization consisting of governmental and NGO representatives. 
22  In 1994, the General Assembly, on the request of the United States, agreed to place a general block on any more 
NGOs being recognized; see UN GA decision 49/426 of 9 December 1994. Later, this was abandoned. 
23  See UN Doc. A/53/170 of 10 July 1998; see note 17. 
24  Donini already stated this in the mid-1990s; Donini, 1996:85. 
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manitarian and social issues as well as the concept of sustainable development, govern-
mental actors seemed to be more inclined to let NGOs in ‘through the cracks in the 
floor’. In addition to growing interests on both parts, also in this case networking and 
interaction has surmounted some reticence with regard to their cooperation. 
In effect, in 1992/1993 during the membership of Ambassador Arria from Vene-
zuela, press conferences and Council field trips were introduced, and more and more 
documents were not classified as confidential any more. In the course of the years, two 
ad hoc procedures have developed which give NGOs the possibility to consult with 
Council members and to be briefed on the one hand, and on the other hand to brief the 
Council on international peace and security issues (Paul, 2001a; 2001b). 
The first ad hoc procedure was referred to as the Arria Formula. This Formula, de-
vised by Ambassador Arria, enables a member of the Council to invite other Council 
members to an informal meeting, held outside of the Council chambers and chaired by 
the inviting member, for the purpose of a briefing of the Council given by one or more 
experts. It was first implemented in 1993 during the civil war in former Yugoslavia, 
when a Bosnian priest had asked for individual meetings with Council members. Only 
Arria agreed and invited Council members to gather over coffee together with the priest. 
After some dispute about the use of the formula to include NGOs and other non-state 
representatives from 1996 onwards, and after the testing of similar approaches, such as 
the so-called Somavía Formula25 or the calling of ‘ad hoc’ events, the question reached 
a deadlock, even though the ‘Razali Proposal’ for Security Council reform of the Gen-
eral Assembly President Razali Ismail of 20 March 1997 proposed ‘greater use’ of the 
Formula. Only two years later, when Council delegates had changed, the formula could 
be revived. On 12 April 2000, the Council held its first regular Arria Formula briefing 
with humanitarian NGO leaders. During that year, the Council also for the first time 
permitted other Member States to attend those meetings, without the right to speak and 
on condition that they wrote to the Council President asking for permission. Today, Ar-
ria Formula meetings take place virtually every month. They are announced as part of 
the regular Council schedule and are provided with full interpretation by the Secretariat. 
No Council meetings or consultations are scheduled in parallel. However, meetings re-
main informal, off-the-record and are held outside the official Council meeting and not 
in the regular formal or informal Council meeting rooms. They take place in a confiden-
tial setting. The meetings are presided over by a member of the Council as service fa-
cilitator for the discussion, but not by the President of the Council (Paul, 2001b). The 
                                                 
25  It included members of the ECOSOC bureau and the bureaus of the General Assembly Second and Third Com-
mittees and was chaired by the head of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. This procedure was not used 
again, because delegations not on the three bureaus objected to being excluded. 
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Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations has suggested 
widening the Arria Formula by increasing the participation of actors from the field (UN, 
2004:46). 
The second ad hoc procedure is the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, 
which is directed towards briefings of NGOs by Council members. In May 1994, after 
NGOs had organized, a conference on Council reform in relation to ongoing reform 
discussions in the UN General Assembly, an informal ‘NGO Working Group on the 
Security Council’ outside the regular CONGO26 Committee framework was set up in 
New York in order to discuss Council reform. This group, consisting only of a few 
NGOs27, gathered several times with Council members and tried at the same time to 
attract as many NGOs as possible (at one point over 100). As General Assembly nego-
tiations on Council reform froze, the group in early 1996 decided to shift its focus to an 
informal process of ‘dialogue’ with the Council. From the end of 1996, only a select 
group of NGO representatives was invited to the meetings with Council members28. 
This Group subsequently was allowed to have regular briefing meetings with Council 
members, it being understood that the Council President should never meet officially 
with NGOs and that other delegates could meet NGOs only in their national capacity. 
Thus, regular meetings were held twice a month, one with the outgoing President and 
the other with other delegates respectively. US Ambassador Bill Richardson in Septem-
ber 1997 was the first to overturn the arrangement when he met with NGOs during his 
presidency, even though in his national capacity. Today, the Group has a closed mem-
bership including some large international NGOs in the fields of humanitarian relief, 
human rights, disarmament, global governance and development. Briefings and meet-
ings with Council members, Presidents and UN officials are always private and off-the-
record, are held nearly every week and usually take place either in a mission or ambas-
sador’s residence, or in an NGO conference room. A twenty-minute presentation given 
by a Council member usually is followed by an hour question time. Typically, sixteen to 
twenty NGO representatives attend. NGOs from other regions that come to New York 
for special events often are invited to join briefings of the Group (Paul, 2001a). 
Thus, the UN Security Council to this day does not accredit NGOs. However, it has 
developed a constant dialogue with civil society representatives, which is adapted, 
through its informality, to the secretive nature of the security issues dealt with. Given 
                                                 
26  The Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social 
Council. 
27  The Global Policy Forum, Amnesty International, EarthAction, the Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy, the 
World Council of Churches, and the World Federalist Movement. 
28  About thirty NGO representatives. 
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the sensitive issue of security, which was at the origin of exclusion of collaboration with 
NGOs in every policy phase during decades, it is astonishing that such an - although 
exclusive, since limited to some NGOs - exchange takes place today. There might be 
some reason to argue that the growing number of NGOs, their increasing access to 
headquarters facilities and to members of the Security Council in person have built up 
some confidence among the people involved. This ‘pressure of everyday encounters’ 
(Alger, 2002:114) might have spread a culture of ‘pulling strings’, of connections and 
networking, which in the end led to a quasi-institutionalization of informal participation 
structures. 
d) Project Implementation below ECOSOC and the GA 
The examples mentioned so far have mostly tackled the first four phases of the policy 
cycle model. However, governments as well as NGOs are also interested in the last two 
policy phases. Yet, policy implementation and evaluation at the UN mostly takes place 
at a level below the main decision-making bodies, especially below ECOSOC and under 
the GA. The vast variety of special programmes and funds operating under the GA, 
such as UNDP or UNHCR, can be mentioned in this context. Here, the UN definitely 
has some interest of working closely with NGOs. Being not only a forum, but also a 
service organization, since the 1980s it has increasingly relied on NGOs with regard to 
project implementation and evaluation. Until the 1970s, functional interaction between 
the UN and operational NGOs in the field was marginal. Given a general shift to a less 
state-centric and more market-driven approach towards development, a rise in the num-
ber of failed States, the emergence of political conditionality of support and of complex 
emergencies, and shortages of staff and money, the UN in the 1990s had to intensify 
transfer of money and services through NGOs (Donini, 1996:88-97; Alger, 2002:116). 
The inducement for civil society engaging with the UN in project implementation often 
is a financial one. Hence, some commentators warn NGOs against falling into the trap 
of subservience (Donini, 1996:97-100). 
e) Public Support Activities Conducted by DPI 
There is another institutionalized UN-NGO relationship which we have not addressed 
so far, namely, association with the Department of Public Information of the UN Secre-
tariat. Similar to the ECOSOC procedure, it has been in existence since the early days of 
the UN in 1946. The trend of mounting figures of NGO accreditation likewise can be 
observed with regard to this association procedure: the number of NGOs associated 
with DPI has grown to 1,600 in 2003. However, DPI association does not touch on any 
phase of the governmental policy cycle. Here, we seem to meet another instance where 
our policy cycle model is not sufficient to explain different pull and push factors. At the 
core of DPI-NGO relations is the mutual interest of the partners in distributing and re-
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ceiving information about the United Nations. In the view of the UN, DPI association is 
targeted towards fostering the UN image and the knowledge about its functioning 
throughout the world. In this way, it could be interpreted as an early approach of the 
world organisation to gain legitimacy in the view of public opinion. 
DPI encourages associated national information services, educational institutions, 
and other non-governmental and interested groups in spreading information about the 
UN. In return, the DPI/NGO Section at UN Headquarters provides information services, 
such as the organization of an Annual DPI Conference for NGOs, weekly briefings, 
joint DPI/NGO information programs, yearly orientation courses and the publication of 
a DPI/NGO Annual Directory. Moreover, it maintains an NGO Resource Center, which 
offers access to current UN documents and press releases, regular mailings of UN in-
formation materials, a video lending library and a selection of UN system publications. 
DPI association does not give formal access to inter-governmental meetings, but it does 
provide ground passes that permit access to the buildings and meeting rooms. Decisions 
about association with DPI, which only take into account four different criteria, are ta-
ken by an in-house Secretariat Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations rather 
than by an inter-governmental body. The somewhat less regulated relationship can be 
explained by the mutual advantages both partners draw from it with regard to their pub-
lic relations activities. Moreover, the operation of the association procedure beyond the 
political realm leaves governments less suspicious about NGO participation and might 
explain why they agree to delegate decision-making about association to a Secretariat 
Committee. 
Finally, the UN also significantly improved its information policy beyond strict asso-
ciation. Meanwhile, most UN documents can be accessed online from the mid-1990s 
onwards. Moreover, the Official Documents System (ODS), which digitally stores all 
UN documents in all six official languages from 1993 to the present and selected docu-
ments from earlier periods, finally was opened to the public free of charge in 2004. This 
opening up surely was supported by a huge progress in information technology. How-
ever, the willingness to offer these possibilities - even not always on a voluntary basis – 
testifies to the fact that, apart from draft texts at their final stage, access to documents, 
especially to adopted texts, does not belong to a central phase of the policy cycle. 
f) Analysis 
We now turn to an analysis of the patterns of interaction between the UN and civil soci-
ety observed with regard to the different main UN bodies. The results mostly confirm 
our hypotheses. Across all UN bodies, we could detect incentives for governments to 
pull in NGOs in the first two and the last two policy phases, namely, in agenda-setting, 
research and analysis, and – as far as projects were executed – in policy implementation 
and evaluation. Here, balanced push and pull factors seem to have brought about fruitful 
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cooperation, even though UN-NGO relations in the case of the GA and the SC remained 
purely informal. On the other hand, governments vigorously defended the core decision-
making phase from formalized partaking of NGOs, although NGOs had growing inter-
ests in that phase the more an issue became pertinent to them. Yet, they could only in-
fluence a policy decision, be it of ECOSOC, of the GA or the SC, through classic lobby-
ing. Only in the case of UN Conferences, we could discover some rare instances where 
governments also relied on NGO support with regard to policy formulation. The follow-
ing table summarises the results. 
Table 2: UN Bodies as per Incentive for Collaboration between Governments and 
NGOs According to the Policy Cycle Model 
UN bodies as  
per incentive 
 
 
Policy phase 
UN bodies interested 
in NGO collaboration 
(UN bodies pulling NGOs in) 
UN bodies of interest to NGOs 
(NGOs pushing into UN bodies) 
Agenda-setting ECOSOC, UN Conferences,  (GA), (SC) 
ECOSOC, UN Conferences,  
GA, SC 
Research and analysis ECOSOC, UN Conferences,  (GA), (SC) 
ECOSOC, UN Conferences,  
GA, SC 
Policy formulation (UN Conferences) ECOSOC, UN Conferences,  GA, SC 
Policy decision - ECOSOC, UN Conferences,  GA, SC 
Policy implementation Project executing bodies Project executing bodies 
Policy evaluation Project executing bodies Project executing bodies 
 
However, the table above shows that this picture does not enable us to account for the 
fact that “[t]here is no more dynamic area of growth and change through practice in the 
UN system than that involving NGOs and other aspects of ‘civil society’” (Alger, 
2002:93). Apparently, some new factors have emerged throughout the last decade, 
which have led to an intensification of IGO-NGO contacts in the classical policy 
phases, but also to interaction for which an explanation has to be sought beyond the 
model of traditional decision-making. As a UN expert paper phrases it: “[i]n truth, it is 
not the UN that has changed - but the world.”(UN, 2003:22). This pointing to the 
catchword of ‘globalisation’ suggests three conclusions, the first giving an explication 
for the enormous increase in NGO participation in the classical UN policy phases, and 
the second and third clarifying the situation by going beyond the policy model: 
First, in a globalized world, there seems to be an increasing need for more expertise 
in order for a forum organization such as the UN to remain effective. Policy issues have 
to be identified within a much broader and more complex global setting, by “putting the 
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issues, not the institution, at the center” (UN, 2004:7-8). The UN Secretary General in 
1999 expressed this in the following words: the UN “is keenly aware that if the global 
agenda is to be properly addressed, a partnership with civil society is not an option: it is 
a necessity… Solutions can be found only if we address global issues together – through 
better cooperation, closer alliances, increased commitment, and a renewed sense of soli-
darity.”29 This might be an explanation for the increased interaction of UN and NGOs at 
the agenda-setting, and research and analysis stage today. 
Second, the emergence of a much larger and issue-oriented civil society, likewise the 
result of an integrating global environment, might have instigated a process of network-
ing which in the end led to a new general pull-in factor on the part of governments. 
Thus, governmental resistance towards NGO participation started to crumble in for-
merly secretive or closed policy fora, such as the General Assembly and especially the 
Security Council. This ‘networking mentality’ of both the UN and civil society was 
largely acknowledged in the report of the UN Panel of Eminent Persons on United Na-
tions-Civil Society Relations, which based its proposals, inter alia, on the principle of 
becoming ‘an outward-looking organization’, with an emphasis on “convening and fa-
cilitating rather than ‘doing’” (see UN, 2004:8-9; 11).  
However, there is a third wave, which seems to be at the origin of the new pull-in 
behaviour of the UN. The early relationship of DPI with civil society already was a first 
sign of this incentive. This third wave has to do with an increasing demand for more 
legitimacy and democracy within international organizations, conditioned by a stimu-
lated concern of NGOs with procedural questions that they formerly ignored (Willets, 
2000:203). In other words, “[t]here is increasing public dissatisfaction with the institu-
tions of global governance [and] increasing public enchantment with traditional democ-
racy” (UN, 2003: 22). In turn, the UN, in its self-perception as a forum organization 
outreaching to the public, seems to be less antipathetic towards NGO claims for more 
participatory rights.  
III. PARTICIPATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE WTO 
a) Rise and Decline of the Club Culture in GATT 
The WTO constitutes an excellent case to contrast the forum-design of the UN-type 
with the club-model of intergovernmental cooperation. For a long time the WTO and its 
predecessor, the 1947 GATT, have been conceived as a stage for intergovernmental 
negotiation. In recent years the WTO has been charged by NGOs with being secretive 
and too reluctant to include non-state actors in its policy making. On the following 
                                                 
29  Speech of Kofi Annan in Montreal, December 1999, at the World Civil Society Conference, Building Global 
Governance Partnerships, Dec. 7 – 11, 1999. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 42) 
- 21 - 
pages we analyze the evolution of the world trade regime with special regard to possible 
incentives for WTO-CSO interaction in all phases of its policy-cycle. As the WTO, 
unlike the UN, has a very slim institutional structure the discussion is not organized 
along distinct bodies of policy making but rather in a historical perspective.  
From the perspective of non-state actors, international trade governance came to a 
promising start after World War II. From 1946 to 1948, the predecessor of today’s 
WTO, the International Trade Organization (ITO), was negotiated, envisaged as an en-
compassing organization in the field of international economic cooperation and only 
inter alia concerned with trade. It was supposed to tackle a much wider range of issues, 
including full employment and economic development (Gardner, 1956; Graz, 1999). On 
the initiative of the United States, non-state actors were admitted to the meetings of the 
preparatory committee that was in charge of producing a Charter for the ITO. Thus, 
NGOs were able to follow the negotiation of the ITO Charter and to submit documenta-
tion to state representatives (Charnovitz and Wickham, 1995). 
Provisions for an institutionalized consultation of NGOs were also made in the first 
draft of the ITO Charter that the U.S. had sponsored. Article 71, paragraph 3 of the draft 
envisaged that the ITO “may make suitable arrangements for consultation and co-
operation” with NGOs and “may invite them to undertake specific tasks”.30 The ration-
ale behind this formulation was that NGOs had research staff, expertise and facilities so 
that the ITO might ask them to carry out certain studies (Charnovitz and Wickham, 
1995:114). In the course of the Charter negotiations, the reference to these “specific 
tasks” dropped out, but the call for consultation and co-operation remained.31 In the 
1940s, there seems to have been a clear demand for co-operation with regard to the ‘re-
search and analysis-phase’ of the policy-cycle in the envisaged ITO. 
The ITO Charter was adopted in March 1948 at the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment in Havana, but was never ratified. What remained from the mul-
tilateral effort was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that had been 
already concluded in 1947. Due to its status as a mere tariff agreement, the GATT re-
gime was not supposed to develop into a proper international organization. The original 
GATT was a Treaty that dealt almost exclusively with trade in products and which “was 
not intended to be a comprehensive world organization. It was a temporary side affair 
meant to serve the particular interests of the major commercial powers who wanted a 
                                                 
30  The Draft Charter is included in the Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Employment, London, October 1946, UN Doc. E/PC/T/33 (1946). 
31  Cf. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Art. 87, Paragraph 2, UN Doc. E/Conf.2/78, 24 
March 1948, published in: United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Docu-
ments, Havana 1948. 
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prompt reduction of tariffs among themselves” (Hudec, 1990:57). Thus, the GATT was 
constructed following a ‘club model’ of international cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 
2001). It relied on confidentiality of proceedings, excluded minor actors from them and 
was geared towards establishing ‘faits accomplis’ that would bind national governments 
to multilateral agreements and limit the influence of domestic protectionist lobbies. In-
sulating the GATT from the dynamics of wider international relations was also useful in 
a different respect. It helped to shield the GATT from too much political interference 
motivated by geostrategic or other non-trade concerns. In turn, by resolving trade dis-
putes within the GATT, economic tensions could be prevented from doing too much 
damage to ‘high politics’.  
Given its limited tasks and its institutional design, it is not surprising that the GATT 
did not develop arrangements for consultation or collaboration with non-governmental 
organizations. As a forum for tariff negotiation it focused on intergovernmental negotia-
tion and decision-making. From the negotiators’ point of view, there was little to gain 
from NGO presence in tariff bargaining. What crucial information could they have pro-
vided? Implementation of projects was not an issue at GATT either. Enhanced publicity 
of proceedings would not have been conducive to the smooth functioning of intergov-
ernmental tariff negotiations or dispute settlement. From the NGO point of view, there 
was little interest in a direct presence at GATT. Tariff negotiations were of interest to 
industry associations that lobbied their national governments. General interest NGOs 
were not too much concerned with questions of trade. Moreover, media interest in the 
GATT was limited, due to the highly technical character of its agenda.  
As actors within the GATT system did not see advantages in opening the regime, and 
actors external to it did not ask for it, trade governance became a secretive affair. In the 
early years of the GATT, not only pull factors, but also push factors were absent. Policy 
making and dispute settlement in GATT remained closed to the public and documents 
about its activity trickled scarcely. Not least because of its insulation, GATT also 
spawned a transnational community of trade experts and diplomats who cultivated a 
considerable team spirit and an ethos of problem solving (Weiler, 2001:337). Things 
changed at the beginning of the 1990s as attention turned to the GATT with the rise of 
the trade and environment debate. Unlike trade, environment was a field in which activ-
ist NGOs had a huge interest. Representatives of environmental NGOs as well as aca-
demic commentators started to argue that in resolving disputes such as Tuna-Dolphin, 
the GATT reached out beyond the scope of its trade facilitation mandate and de facto 
adjudicated environmental policies (Esty, 1999).  
At the same time, negotiations of the Uruguay round were drawing to a close and the 
World Trade Organization with a much broader mandate than the GATT appeared at 
the horizon. The world trade regime entered a phase of enhanced (re-)politicization 
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(Howse, 2002). Non-state actors played an important part in this process as emerging 
transnational NGO networks started campaigning against the pitfalls of globalization 
and the neoliberal principles that guided the institutions of global governance, in par-
ticular the IMF and the World Bank. Not only did they expose international organiza-
tions to public scrutiny, they also knocked on their doors, demanding access, insight and 
a voice in their policy making. Recalling the model outlined above we can conclude that 
the rapid enlargement of the GATT’s mandate and scope of activity in the 1990s led to a 
renewed interest by non-state actors to push into this international regime. 
b) Transparency and Access to Information at the WTO 
When the WTO was founded in 1994, NGOs were already pushing into the intergov-
ernmental institutions of trade governance. From the perspective of the WTO, the ques-
tion of how to deal with transparency and access for non-state actors became imminent 
(Charnovitz, 1996). In the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, it is 
stated only that “[t]he General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consul-
tation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters 
related to those of the WTO” (Art. V, Paragraph 2). The “may” in this paragraph leaves 
an ample discretion to policy-makers to determine what this might mean in practice. 
The WTO General Council took a first step towards clarification in July 1996 when 
it adopted its “Guidelines for arrangements on relations with Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations”.32 In this document, Members pledge to enhance transparency of WTO 
policy making and state that “[t]he Secretariat should play a more active role in its di-
rect contacts with NGOs who, as a valuable resource, can contribute to the accuracy and 
richness of the public debate.”33 Thus, the WTO officially views the main benefit of 
liaising with NGOs in their capacity to channel trade issues into public debate.34 In this, 
the WTO seems to acknowledge that there is a deficit in its relations with its global con-
stituency. Assigning NGOs the task to improve the “accuracy and richness of the public 
debate” sounds quite magnanimous, given that many vociferous NGOs campaign 
against WTO principles and policies. Yet, it documents that the WTO was responding 
here to a legitimacy challenge posed by non-state actors. The organization in fact ac-
knowledged that there was insufficient public debate on its policy choices. 
With regard to transparency and access to documents, the WTO made some remark-
able progress over the years, at least if compared with the old GATT regime. The or-
                                                 
32  Cf. WTO Doc. WT/L/162, 23 July 1996. 
33  Ibid., Paragraph IV. 
34  See also Paragraph II of the Declaration, in which “Members recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the 
awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree in this regard to improve transparency and de-
velop communication with NGOs”. 
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ganization’s website has been judged as being among the best in the field of interna-
tional organizations (One World Trust, 2003:15). In fact, compared to the electronic 
jungle that the EU and the UN have created, the WTO’s presence on the web is re-
markably accessible, user-friendly, and reasonably up to date. On 14 May 2002, the 
General Council eventually revised its procedures for the circulation and derestriction of 
documents.35 According to this decision, all official WTO documents shall be unre-
stricted and made available via the website in the organization’s official languages.36 
This provision includes the minutes of meetings that will be derestricted automatically 
45 days after their circulation.37 Hence, with regard to the documentation of its policy 
process, the WTO has become a rather transparent international organization. 
c) Access to WTO Meetings 
The situation is completely different, however, with regard to direct access by observers 
to the policy-making process. In its 1996 guidelines on relations with NGOs, the Gen-
eral Council states “there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible 
for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.”38 Thus, 
NGOs are still excluded from almost all meetings of WTO bodies, even at the level of 
specialized committees. There is only one exception to this general rule. Since 1996, 
some sort of accreditation is possible for the Ministerial Conferences that are convened 
at least once every two years. Applications from NGOs are accepted “on the basis of 
Article V, paragraph 2 of the WTO Agreement”.39 This means in practice that, when 
filing their request for registration, NGOs must indicate in detail how they are “con-
cerned with matters related to those of the WTO”. Although participatory rights are con-
fined to attending the Plenary Sessions of the Conference, numerous NGOs have sought 
accreditation to the Ministerials in recent years.40 The following table illustrates this 
development. 
                                                 
35  Cf. ‘Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents’, WTO Doc. WT/L/452, 16 May 2002. 
36  Ibid., Paragraph 1 and 3. 
37  Ibid., Paragraph 2(c). 
38  WTO Doc. WT/L/162, 23 July 1996, Paragraph VI. 
39  Source: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm, accessed 26 January 2006. 
40  The politically most interesting part of the negotiation at international conferences, however, does not take place 
in the plenary sessions but in official or non-official meetings of smaller groups of delegates. 
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Table 3:  Participation of NGOs in WTO Ministerial Conferences since 1996 
Ministerial Accredited NGOs NGOs represented Registered  participants 
Singapore 1996 159 108 235 
Geneva 1998 153 128 362 
Seattle 1999 776 686 1,500 approx 
Doha 2001 651 370 370 
Cancún 2003 961 795 1,578 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/ngo_minconf_6oct03_e.htm (accessed 15 January 
2006).  
The possibility to watch Plenary Meetings is certainly not the main incentive for NGO 
representatives travelling to the Ministerials. Presence at the conference venue enables 
them to lobby national delegates, to contact journalists and to distribute information 
material in the designated NGO areas that the WTO provides at the sidelines of the con-
ference. Yet, there is no way in which non-state actors could enter a regular and mutual 
dialogue with policy-makers or to exchange views with the assembly of delegates as a 
whole. Intergovernmental and non-state areas remain separated. As the WTO remains a 
member-driven organization with strong emphasis on intergovernmental negotiation 
and decision-making, the lack of NGO-access to meetings can be explained by the con-
tinuous absence of pull factors on the governmental side.  
The clear separation and protection of the intergovernmental realm from NGO activi-
ties is characteristic of other forms of WTO outreach to civil society. The WTO organ-
izes three kinds of outreach meetings. First, since 1997 there are large-scale public 
symposia to consult with NGO representatives on topics that are of particular concern to 
NGOs, such as environment and development. Symposia take place approximately once 
a year, and at times have been co-organized with other Geneva-based IGOs, such as 
UNCTAD.41 These symposia inter alia are attended by government representatives. 
They are designed, however, to cover a wide range of trade topics and are rarely de-
voted to the discussion of specific proposals on the WTO agenda. Second, NGOs that 
have published trade-related studies or reports on issues falling within the WTO’s man-
date may be invited to the Centre William Rappard for an informal discussion of their 
work with interested delegations and Secretariat officials. NGOs are invited on the ini-
tiative of the WTO Secretariat or of a member state. There are also issue-specific dis-
cussions organized by the Secretariat for NGO representatives. Third, the Secretariat 
organizes briefings for NGO representatives by WTO staff on current issues of world 
                                                 
41  In 1997, the WTO and UNCTAD co-sponsored an NGO meeting that preceded the ‘High-Level Meeting on 
Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries’ Trade Development’, see WTO Doc. WT/LDC/HL/16, 24 
October 1997. 
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trade governance. Yet, none of these activities entails a political dialogue with national 
delegates. None of these activities can be allocated to a distinct phase in the policy-
cycle. They rather seem to be a response to some general challenges to organizational 
legitimacy that the WTO faced in the 1990s. 
Finally, in the WTO dispute settlement system there is the possibility for NGOs and 
private individuals to file amicus curiae briefs. There is no explicit reference to such a 
practice in the respective agreements so that the issue has spurred quite some contro-
versy among WTO state parties and academic experts.42 In several of its rulings, the 
WTO Appellate Body affirmed that it has the authority to accept unsolicited statements 
by non-governmental organizations or individuals, even if the latter do not have a legal 
right to make such submission or to be heard by the Appellate Body. 43 In one controver-
sial case, the Appellate Body even devised an ad hoc Special Procedure, setting out 
modalities for the submission of amicus curiae briefs (without considering any of them 
in the end).44 Given the legal uncertainty around current practice, it is difficult to assess 
if this is likely to become a valuable tool for non-state actors wishing to make their con-
cerns heard in WTO dispute settlement. In this respect, much will depend on the out-
come of the Doha round of negotiations whose agenda comprises a review of rules and 
procedures guiding WTO dispute settlement, aiming inter alia at a clarification of the 
amicus curiae issue. 
d) Analysis 
We have now outlined the rules and practice of the collaboration between the WTO and 
non-state actors. How can we explain this pattern of cooperation and in particular the 
recent advances in access and transparency? For WTO staff and policy-makers there 
should have been rather little changes in the incentive structure outlined in table 1 since 
                                                 
42  This controversy is focused inter alia on the interpretation of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-
ing the Settlement of Disputes which is Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement (DSU), and the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review (WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/7, 1 May 2003); see Appleton 2000, Mavroidis 2002, Howse 2003.  
43  For a discussion by the Appellate Body on the admissibility of briefings from non-governmental actors to the 
Dispute Settlement Panel, see United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report 
of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, para 104-110. For the right of the Appel-
late Body to receive and consider such briefs, see United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS138/AB/R, 10 May 2000, para 42; and European Communities – Trade Description of 
Sardines, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 September 2002, para 164.   
44  This procedure was introduced by the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case, which was of great interest to envi-
ronmental NGOs; see European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
Communication from the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/9, 8 November 2000. 
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the days of the old GATT. As the WTO still is a member-driven organization, its Secre-
tariat and staff play a rather subordinate role in the identification of new issues. Given 
the degree of professionalization in the trade community, it seems unlikely that WTO 
staff or delegates from the industrialized world would have to rely on NGO expertise in 
research or policy formulation. In theory, developing country delegates at the WTO 
with a lack of support staff and technical expertise would have more reason to collabo-
rate with non-state actors. So far, however, this potential for collaboration has not been 
realized. Many developing country delegates still distrust NGOs because they perceive 
them as pursuing the political agenda of industrialized societies (Türk, 2003). In fact, 
delegates from major developing countries such as India have been particularly opposed 
to conferring any official status to NGOs at the WTO (Zutshi, 2001:390).  
With regard to the implementation of an organization’s projects through non-state ac-
tors, there is equally little room for collaboration at the WTO. Unlike the World Bank, 
for example, the WTO is a rule-making organization and simply does not have any pro-
jects to implement. The monitoring of member States’ compliance with WTO rules is 
carried out by the organization itself, for example, through its trade policy reviews. 
Moreover, member states can be expected to bring other parties’ non-compliance before 
the dispute settlement body, at least if they suffer economic losses from deviant behav-
iour. In sum, there is little incentive for the organization itself to pull NGOs in. Thus, 
the pattern of collaboration seems to follow largely the pressure of NGOs pushing into 
the organization, limited by the resistance of the IGO in protecting its intergovernmental 
core on the other. The following table illustrates this: 
Table 3: The constellation of push and pull factors at the WTO 
Influencing 
factors 
 
Policy phase 
Pull factors 
(IGOs pulling NGOs in) 
Push factors 
(NGOs pushing into IGOs) 
Agenda-setting - NGOs seek to influence the WTO’s agenda 
Research and analysis - NGOs seek to inform the research process in WTO 
Policy formulation - NGOs seek to influence the WTO’s policy formulation 
Policy decision - NGOs seek to influence the WTO’s policy choices 
Policy implementation - - 
Policy evaluation - - 
 
Given the complete absence of pull-factors in the WTO case, we need to explain how 
exactly NGO ‘push’ leads to cooperation without incentives on the IGO side. A rather 
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diffuse mechanism seems to be at work here – a mechanism that we have not captured 
in the range of factors identified in Table 1. In the 1990s, NGOs have challenged the 
legitimacy of the WTO by questioning its secretive and exclusionary policy style. They 
invoked transparency, stakeholder participation and inclusiveness as general standards 
of good governance (Woods and Narlikar, 2001). Like any other institution of global 
governance that relies on voluntary support, the WTO cannot be indifferent about its 
perceived legitimacy (Franck, 1990; Steffek, 2003). If an international organization vio-
lates standards of good governance that are widely viewed as appropriate, support from 
member governments might decline; at least if these governments are democratically 
elected and sensitive to street protests and shifts in public opinion. Moreover, it can be 
assumed that the often quite internationalist and committed staff at the organization is 
sensitive to shaming campaigns. This is why NGOs try to use public delegitimation as a 
lever to open the door to international governmental institutions. Neither governmental 
delegates nor the civil servants in the WTO would be well advised to completely ignore 
NGO campaigns against the organization.  
Another factor that we had not accounted for in our initial scheme is a sociological 
one. International organizations are populated by people socialized in a certain envi-
ronment and adherent to a specific set of values and principles (Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004; Johnston, 2001). They hence develop an institutional culture which might be 
more or less favourable to collaboration with NGOs. The club culture of GATT that 
persists among delegates and officials in the WTO certainly contributes to the difficul-
ties of NGOs in getting access to the organization (Wilkinson, 2001). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have investigated patterns of civil society participation in the UN and 
the WTO. We developed an analytical framework that identified the motivations that 
IGOs and civil society actors might have for engaging in consultation and collaboration. 
In the two cases studied here, the model of a policy cycle proved quite useful to struc-
ture the empirical enquiry and to identify push and pull dynamics as determinants of 
cooperation. In particular, we found that collaboration is in fact extensive in all those 
fields of political activity where both IGOs and NGOs can derive clear-cut benefits 
from it. Cases in point were the identification of issues, research and fact finding in the 
case of the UN as a forum organization, as well as the joint implementation of projects.  
In the case of the WTO, incentives for collaboration are much weaker on the side of 
the international organization, as there is little need for NGO expertise in research, as-
sistance in the implementation of projects or monitoring of Parties’ compliance. In both 
organizations, we found the tendency to protect an intergovernmental core of negotia-
tion, that is, decision-making processes among state delegates. In the UN system, this is 
evidenced by the absence of a formalized negotiating role for NGOs in any of the main 
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UN bodies and fora, or of any institutionalized position at all, despite some informal 
developments in the last years. It seems that the intensity of efforts to protect this core is 
correlated with the political importance that member state governments attach to it; 
hence we should expect stronger protection when it comes to hard issues such as secu-
rity, trade, and finance and lesser in other policy fields. 
Yet, from the analysis of the two cases it also emerged that the factors envisaged in 
our initial framework might not be sufficient to account for all dynamics of collabora-
tion between IGOs and NGOs. There seems to be a less concrete and tangible benefit 
for IGOs collaborating with NGOs that does not fit in any of the phases of policy mak-
ing. It rather seems to be related to the more general public perception of the legitimacy 
of the organization. We found two instances of such a tendency. First, the UN Secre-
tariat seeks assistance of NGOs in mobilizing public support for and a positive percep-
tion of the organization. Second, in the case of the WTO, we found civil society actors 
seeking to damage the image of the IGO, pointing to its deficits in transparency and 
public access to policy making. The WTO responded to these arguments, partly by try-
ing to refute them, partly by adjusting its respective rules and policies. We should there-
fore add to our analytical framework a general interest of IGOs in maintaining the per-
ceived legitimacy of the organization. 
Another factor that we had initially not accounted for is a sociological one. Interna-
tional organizations are populated by people socialized in a certain environment and 
adherent to a specific set of values and principles. They hence develop an institutional 
culture which might be more or less favourable to collaboration with NGOs. The club 
culture of GATT that still persists among many delegates and officials in the WTO cer-
tainly contributes to the difficulties of NGOs in getting access to the organization. In the 
UN, in contrast, a sort of ‘networking mentality’ apparently has produced the opposite 
result. Encompassing also some selected and well-known NGO representatives, this 
specific institutional culture has come to burst the formerly closed doors of the sancta 
sanctorum of the General Assembly and the Security Council. 
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